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I

EARLY thirty years ago Professor Ernst Freund published his
well-known work, "The Police Power.", Like all of Professor
Freund's writings, it was closely analytical, exhaustive, and
scholarly. Examining the concept of the police power, he defined it as
"the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating
the use of liberty and property."' The noted author's discussion of the
police power was necessarily bifurcate. There was the problem on the one
hand of the objectives legally to be comprehended under the broad general purpose of promoting the public welfare, and on the other, of the private interests restricted or abolished in the attainment of the broader social end. To the first part of the problem Professor Freund devoted over
one-half his work. Police power objectives were placed in two general
categories, first, the protection of so-called "primary social interests," the
safety, order, and morality of the community; and second, the advancement of economic interests, that is, the control by the state of those
processes by which the material goods of the world are acquired, possessed,
and distributed. Concerning the use of the police power for these two general objectives, Professor Freund said, "That the organized community
should afford its members protection against physical danger and moral
scandal is generally admitted, and only the question to what extent this
protection should go, is controverted. It is otherwise as to economic interests. Wealth is almost as essential to our civilization as safety, order, and
morals; but while these can be secured to a substantial degree by restraint,
the acquisition of wealth is based on active efforts; and while systematic
restraint proceeds naturally from our government, active effort must be
chiefly individual. Our economic system is essentially individualistic, and,
more than that is based upon peaceful struggle and conflict. An absolute
governmental control over economic interests, similar to that over the interests of order, peace, and security would be possible only if with regard
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to the former as well as with regard to the latter, equality were a desirable
or practicable end, i.e., if the state were socialistic." 3
Professor Freund's "Police Power" preceded the great development of
that subject by the United States Supreme Court. Such leading and significant cases as Lochner v. New York,4 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, s
Adair v. United States, 6 Muller v. Oregon7 and Noble State Bank v. Haskell,' were all decided after the appearance of the "Police Power" in 1904.
Professor Freund's analysis had in it, however, a very considerable
amount of prophetic vision. Where legislation has been directed towards
the advancement of public health, safety, or morals, the Supreme Court
has quite consistently sustained it.9 Its refusal to sanction certain laws
because of a belief that either the claimed danger to the public interest did
not exist,"" or that the burden placed upon the restricted private right was
too great to justify a supposed public advantage," cannot be taken as
showing disbelief in the propriety of the statute's purpose in and of itself.
Even economic interests have been secured in a large number of instances,
carefully catalogued by Professor Freund.2 The police power, as well as
the ordinary civil and criminal laws, protect against fraud.3 Gambling and
stock market speculation to the frequent ruin of those indulging have been
validly prohibited, perhaps because of an element of the immoral .4 Usury
and bankruptcy laws preserve for the debtor a minimum of economic existence.,' The odiousness of monopolies and combinations in restraint of
trade raising prices to artificial levels has been generally admitted, 6 and
the power of the state to regulate charges of businesses affected with a
3
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public interest, declared in the early case of Munn v. Illinois 7 has been
recognized. In the above classes of cases no serious charge can be made
that the court has substantially interfered with legislative prerogatives.
In a number of cases, indeed, it has found a permissible objective in the
legislation at hand, where it seems likely that the true purpose was of a
much more questionable character. 5
In spite of this liberal interpretation of the police power in the fields
above indicated, it is apparent that the welfare of the public has by no
means as yet been achieved. Even as to the pre-depression era high official authority9 was compelled to speak guardedly. The enumeration of
the ills of specific industries, and of the agricultural classes"' need not be
repeated here. Although the condition of labor was reported generally
satisfactory as compared to the pre-war period, nevertheless there was
"a large and persistent volume of unemployment even in the very active
years. ' ' 2YThere was, moreover, a feeling in many circles that the prosperity of the post-war decade was very unevenly distributed. Two hundred large corporations controlled over one-third of the nation's business
wealth. 2 In 1929, five hundred four individuals had average annual incomes of over two million three hundred and fifty thousand dollars each.
The aggregate income of these five hundred odd individuals was approximately as great as the value of all the wheat and cotton grown in the
country in a year by over two and one-third million farmers.2 3 Of all persons gainfully employed, over ninety-four percent received less than three
thousand dollars per annum 24 while at the bottom of the scale, near the
starvation level, even in times of plenty, were millions of unskilled laborers, concerning whom the Secretary of Labor in President Hoover's Cab,794 U.S. 113, 24 L.Ed. 77 (1877). See Robinson, The Public Utility Concept in American
Law, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 277 (1928).
.8 See Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 36 Sup. Ct. 370, 6o L.Ed. 79 (1916);
Hebe Co. v. Shaw, 248 U.S. 297, 39 Sup. Ct. 125, 63 L.Ed. 255 (i919).
19 Report of Committee on Recent Economic Changes, President's Conference on Unemployment (2929).
- Ibid., x; Ibid., Special report on agriculture, Edwin G. Nourse, 547.
Ibid., Special report on condition of labor, Leo Wolman, 492.
- Gardiner Means, The Growth in the Relative Importance of the Large Corporation in
American Economic Life, 21 Amer. Econ. Rev. 10-37 (931). See Berle & Means, The Modern
Corporation and Private Property (1932).
23The figures are taken from note 55 in the dissent of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 53 Sup. Ct. 481, 77 L.Ed. 553 (i933). Mr. Justice Brandeis'
dissent is heavily annotated with references to material bearing on the growth of the great
American corporations.
"4 Nystrom, Economic Principles of Consumption (X929), x8o et seq.
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inet said, "If we think of those in all our industries who may lack mechanical skill but who nevertheless shoulder the heavy weights and do the
roughest work, we find a great part of American industry shot through
with these unfortunates. It is not an exaggeration to say that we have
some millions of these hard-worked but underpaid Americans. Taken together with their families and their dependents, I would venture to say
that we have among us from ten to fifteen millions of people who do not
share as they should in the prosperity enjoyed by the rest of us. Morally,
economically, and on the grounds of simple humanity, this inequality
should not be allowed to exist in this richest nation in history. ' ' 2s
To this pre-existing dissatisfaction, the market crash of 1929 and the
ensuing years of depression have added fuel to the flames of discontent.
Statistics of unemployment, farm foreclosures, bank failures, and families
on public charity were not required to convince most people that our
economic society was badly out of joint, and there arose a strident cry
that something be done about it. President Franklin D. Roosevelt in his
recent book, "Looking Forward," published just before he assumed the
presidency, said, "We have not been brought to our present state by any
natural calamity, by drouth, or floods, or earthquakes, or by the destruction of our productive machinery or man power. We have a superabundance of raw materials, of equipment for manufacturing these materials
into the goods which we need, and transportation and commercial facilities for making them available to all who need them. A great portion of
our machinery stands idle, while millions of able-bodied and intelligent
men and women in dire need are clamoring for the opportunity to work.
Our power to operate the economic machine we have created is challenged." 6 There were those who were convinced that the assumed individualistic basis for our economic life would have to be abandoned. In the
words of one writer, "The battle for an individualistic laissez-faire economy is definitely lost..... We shall do well to avert our eyes from the
pretense that we can achieve a fundamentally individualistic society ....
Why not frankly acknowledge that sensible management for collective
''
purposes is the necessary control, and see what we can do to achieve it? 27
Others, without such frank abnegation of individualistic economics, also
proposed governmental controls over the economic system that a decade
2S
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ago would have been considered radical. Back in 1929, Wesley C. Mitchell reporting for the Committee on Recent Economic Changes of President Hoover's Conference on Unemployment, said, "If we are to maintain
business prosperity we must continue to earn it month after nionth and
year after year by intelligent effort. The incomes disbursed to consumers
and to wage earners in particular must be increased on a scale sufficient to
pay for the swelling volume of consumer's goods sent to market. The credit structure must be kept in dual adjustment to the earnings of business
enterprise ..... Commodity stocks must be held in line with current
sales. Overcommitments of all sorts must be avoided. ' '21 The same ideas
were echoed later by the president elect, "I believe that we are at the
threshold of a fundamental change in our economic thought. I believe
that in the future we are going to think less about the producer and more
about the consumer. Do what we may to inject health into our ailing
economic order, we cannot make it endur for long unless we can bring
about a wiser, more equitable distribution of the national income. It is
well within the inventive capacity of men, who have built up this great
social and economic machine capable of satisfying the wants of all, to insure that all who are willing and able to work receive from it at least the
necessities of life. In such a system, the reward for a day's work will have
to be greater, on the average, than it has been, and the reward to capital,
'' 9
especially capital which is speculative, will have to be less. 2
II
In answer to the popular demand for action to relieve the economic distress, and in concrete realization of the philsosophy that subordinates private rights of property and contract to social needs, legislative bodies the
country over have considered and enacted many laws. Based on the premise that there is a gross inequality in bargaining power between the employer and the employee, and that the labor union must be preserved and
encouraged as a necessary instrument for advancing the workers' interests, eight states have passed statutes declaring void agreements, exacted
from the employee as a condition of his employment, not to join a labor
union.30 For the purpose of providing a modicum of income to workers
deprived of their jobs by industrial causes beyond their own control, and
28
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as an incentive to employers to stabilize employment throughout the calendar year, laws have been enacted requiring employers to maintain for
their employees unemployment insurance or reserve funds.3y Thus unemployment is added to industrial accident and disease as a risk of industry
to be borne at least in part by the employer and ultimately by the consuming public.32 Farmers' strikes and the spectacle of roads picketed to
prevent the carriage of milk to market have produced acts in at least four
states to fix the price of milk in the interests of an admittedly under-compensated agricultural producer. 33 In spite of the decision of Adkins v.
Children's Hospital,34 this year five states enacted legislation attempting
to guarantee to women and minors a minimum wage to be determined by
a state commission; 3" and nine other states already possess such legisla3' 23 Am. Lab. Leg. Rev. 9 and 73 (1933). The Democratic party and President Roosevelt
have both publicly declared in favor of unemployment insurance. Roosevelt, op. cit., supra,
note 26, 116.
32Wisconsin Laws, Special Session, 1931-1932, Chap. 20, Amended, Laws of 1933, Chaps.
186 and 383. See Brandeis and Raushenbush, Wisconsin's Unemployment Reserves and Compensation Act, 7 Wis. L. Rev. 136 (1932); Lambert, Compulsory Unemployment Insurance and
Due Process of Law, 7 Wis. L. Rev. 146 (X932); Jacobson, The Wisconsin Unemployment
Compensation Act, 32 Col. L. Rev. 409 (1932); Commons, The Groves Unemployment Reserves Law, 22 Am. Lab. Leg. Rev. 8 (1932); Raushenbush, Wisconsin's Unemployment Compensation Act, 22 Am. Lab. Leg. Rev. II (1932); Goodrich, Unemployment Reserves by Law,
22 Am. Lab. Leg. Rev. 33 (1932). This proposed legislation falls into two types: first, that
based upon an insurance idea, sometimes called the Ohio plan; and second, the reserve plan.
For a critical discussion of the two types of plans, see article by Karl T. Compton in 23 Am.
Lab. Leg. Rev. 96 (1933). Mr. Compton points out that under the insurance plan the funds
are pooled by the state. He feels that this would work in normal times, but would break down
in times of serious depression. Under the reserve plan each employer's contribution would be
credited to him, and his contribution cease when a certain amount per employee would be
reached, thus tending to make the employer stabilize employment. Mr. Compton cites figures
to show that in Massachusetts the average cost would have been four-tenths of one cent per
sales dollar, and that had the plan been in effect prior to the present depression the reserve
funds would have reached $70,000,000.
33 N.Y. Laws of x933, Chap. 158; N.J. Laws of 1933, Chap. 169; Wis. Laws 1933, Chap. 64;
Ohio, 1933, H.B. No. 671 (session laws not available); also Manitoba, 1933 (session laws not
available). These bills have been made available through the courtesy of the Wisconsin Legislative Reference Library, State Capitol, Madison, Wisconsin. The New York act became law
April io, 1933. Section 300 provides, "This article is enacted in the exercise of the police power
of the state, and its purposes generally are to protect the public health and public welfare."
Other section headings are: 302-Milk Control Board; 3o8-Licenses to Milk Dealers; 312Order Fixing Price of Milk; 314-Interstate and Federal Compacts; 319-Duration of Board
(termination March 3r, 1934). The rules and orders issued, and forms prescribed, by the
boards in New York and New Jersey are now available in mimeographed and printed form.
34261 U.S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394, 67 L.Ed. 785 (1923).
3s Illinois, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and Utah. The Illinois act is Senate
Bill No. 730 (session laws not available); for text of latter four acts see Monthly Labor Review, issue of June 1933.
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tion. 36 The preamble to the Illinois act, repudiating former individualistic
notions and clearly expressing the social philosophy on which it is based,
declares, "Many women and minors employed for gain in the state of Illinois are not as a class equally equipped for bargaining with their employers in regard to a minimum fair wage and standards, and 'freedom of contract' as applied to their relations with their employes is in many cases
illusory." The other statutes contain similar provisions. Lastly come the
proposals to control through the power of the government the supply of
goods and productive machinery to the end that capital be not wasted in
unwise ventures; the labor market be not disturbed; and eras of alternating hilarious prosperity and melancholic depression be banished37
The "National Industrial Recovery Act," of June 16, 1933, the
"N.I.R.A.,"38 in its possible effect on the country's economic, political and
36 California, Colorado, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota,
Washington, and Wisconsin. A news item in the New York Times for March 23, 1933 reported
that Professor Felix Frankfurter had issued a warning that the New York legislature should not
include men in the statute or it would be declared unconstitutional. The New York Act in the
preamble states the factual background and declares an emergency. Section 55o continues,
"The evils of oppressive, unreasonable and unfair wages are such as to render imperative the
exercise of the police power of the state for the protection of industry and of the men and
women and minors employed therein, and of the public interest of the community at large in
their health and well-being and in the prevention of the deterioration of the race."--Quoted
from Senate Bill No. 1868, March 22, 1933. The Calendar of Bills introduced into the New
York Legislature for 1933 lists sixty labor bills. The American Federationist, June 1933, 632636, shows the progress of various labor bills in the state legislatures. A bill concerning hours of
labor for women and minors was introduced in the Connecticut Legislature (Senate Bill No.
470). For legislation proposed and enacted concerning wages and hours of labor, see U.S. Dept.
of Labor, Women's Bureau, News Letters vol. XIII, No. 6, June i, 1933. It is to be noted that
the enactments do not attempt to fix a living wage. The recent minimum wage statutes contain
penalties on employers, and a granting to employees of a right to recover the balance of minimum wages unpaid in a civil action against the employer. E.g., N.H. Act, sec. 23; N.J. Act,
sec. 16; N.Y. Act, sec. 566; Utah Act, sec. x3.

37In the special session of the 1931 Wisconsin Legislature a measure known as Bill No. 3A
was introduced with the sanction of Governor LaFollette to foster economic planning. It did
not, however, pass. See also, Roosevelt, op. cit., supra, note 26, 47 et seq. "That, which
seems most important to me in the long run is the problem of controlling by adequate planning
the creation and the distribution of those products, which our vast economic machine is capable
of yielding. I do not mean to curtail new enterprise. But think carefully of the vast sums of
capital or credit which in the past decade have been devoted to unjust enterprises-to the development of unessentials and to the multiplication of many products far beyond the capacity
of the nation to absorb ..... It is towards stability that we must move if we are to profit by
our recent experience ..... Let us not confuse objectives with methods ..... When the nation becomes substantially united in favor of planning the broad objectives of civilization, then
true leadership must unite thought behind definite methods. The country needs and, unless I
mistake its temper, demands bold, persistent experimentation. It is common sense to take a
method and try it; if it fails, admit it frankly and try another. But above all try something.
..... "See also Wesley C. Mitchell, supra, note 28.
38See Acts of 73rd Congress, Extra Session, Act of June i6, 1933, 48 St. L ..............
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legal history overshadows all other current legislation, and perhaps all
39
other legislation since the constitution was first promulgated. Although
it presents compelling questions concerning the federal and executive
power granted, we can only consider it here as an expression of the power
of the government over individual economic interests. The preamble, after declaring a national emergency, clearly proclaims the determination of
the government to take a direct part in controlling our economic system
for the general good of all our people ..... "It is hereby declared to be
the policy of Congress .... to provide for the general welfare by promoting the organization of industry for the purpose of co-operative action
among trade groups, to induce and maintain united action of labor and
management under adequate governmental sanctions and supervision, to
eliminate unfair competitive practices, to promote the fullest possible
utilization of the present productive capacity of industries, to avoid undue
restriction of production (except as may be temporarily required), to increase the consumption of industrial and agricultural products by increasing purchasing power, to reduce and relieve unemployment, to improve standards of labor, and otherwise to rehabilitate industry and to
conserve natural resources." Section three of the act provides for the voluntary submission by trade or industrial groups of codes of fair competition. Such codes are, however, subject to presidential approval, and, "the
President may as a condition of his approval .... impose such conditions ....
for the protection of consumers, competitors, employees, and
others, and in furtherance of the public interest, and may provide such
exceptions to and exemptions from the provisions of such code, as the
President in his discretion deems necessary to effectuate the policy herein
declared." Moreover, if any trade or industry fails to present a code
capable of securing presidential approval, "the President after such public
notice and hearing as he shall specify, may prescribe and approve a code
of fair competition for such trade or industry." Again, if the President
finds that any trade, industry, or subdivision thereof is engaging in activities contrary to the policy declared in the preamble, for the purpose of
securing effective codes of fair competition he may require a license of
those engaged in such trades and industries, and thereafter, if interstate
or foreign commerce is thereby affected, it becomes a criminal offence to
engage in such trade or industry without the presidential license.40 Ap39See President Roosevelt's statement on signing the National Industrial Recovery Act,
"History probably will record the National Industrial Recovery Act as the most important and
far-reaching legislation ever enacted by the American Congress. It represents a supreme effort
to stabilize for all time the many factors which make for the prosperity of the nation, and the
preservation of American standards."
41Supra, note 38, §4.
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propriate penal sanctions are also provided for violations of the codes of
fair competition.
Although up to the time of the present writing this far-reaching legislation has depended largely on voluntary action spurred on by exhortation,
banners, and parades, nevertheless it is still a mailed fist concealed in a
silken glove. The President has exercised his power of deleting from the
voluntary codes provisions deemed inimical to the purposes of the statute, 4' and back of it all lies the yet unused sanctions of the licensing power
and the criminal prosecution. While there is a tendency of the proponents
of the law, in defending its provisions against the doubts of the timid, conservative, and legally minded, to aver that it is only a normal exercise of
the traditional powers of government, yet these same defenders almost in
the same breath recognize its truly revolutionary character. 42 As stated
by a learned commentator, "The organization of industry which it will
foster, and the sanctions it provides to effectuate its purposes, involve a
distinct revision of the traditional legal view of free private enterprise and
competition developed by the Supreme Court of the United States in interpreting the Constitution and the federal anti-trust laws." 43 The chief of
the legal division of the National Recovery Administration in a radio address of July 31st, wondered how many of "the fortunate people of this
country understand that the long discussed revolution is actually under
way in the United States. There is no need to prophesy. It is here. It is
41 See order of the president of September 18, 1933, eliminating from the code submitted by
the bituminous coal industry certain provisions attempting to construe section 7(a) of the
National Industrial Recovery Act relating to the right of collective bargaining on the part of
employees.
41 Cf. Senator Robert F. Wagner before the Committee on Finance of the United States
Senate in the hearings on the bill. "The bill marks a far-reaching departure from the philosophy that the government should remain a silent spectator while the people of the United
States, without plan and without organization, vainly attempt to achieve their social and economic ideals. It recognizes that planlessness and disjunctive efforts lead to waste, destruction,
exploitation and disaster and that purposive planning awaits the substitution of regulated
planning in place of the unlimited and frequently pernicious competition which we have heretofore regarded as the sole guardian of the public welfare. This trend in thought and action is
accompanied by a widening concept of business-that all business is affected with a public interest." Later in the same hearing, he said, "We are not seeking a change; we are seeking a
rationalization of competition, instead of permitting the sweatshop, by exploitation of labor,
to break us down by its competition ..... We regulate the hours of labor within a state. We
regulate all sorts of things and it has become necessary. The same argument was used when
we tried to pass the workmen's compensation law within the states. Today that philosophy is
accepted ..... The bill is drawn to expire at the end of two years. It is frankly an experiment. But it is an experiment worth making ..... " Reported in Federal Trade Regulation
Service, C. C. H. (7th ed. 1933), 1944 ef seq.
43 Kirsh,

The National Industrial Recovery Act (1933),
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in process. In this favored land of ours we are attempting, possibly, the
greatest experiment inhistory."44
III
These laws, state and federal, present a radical advance in American
economic, political, and legal theory. Sooner or later the highest courts of
the states and of the nation must determine whether they are permissable
under our constitutional government. Specifically the question will be, is
the police power concept sufficient to over-ride the individual rights of
property and contract hitherto protected by the due process of law clauses
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. There have, indeed, been
broad and liberal interpretations of the police power in the opinions of the
United States Supreme Court.45 Nevertheless, when the question has been
squarely presented and legislation has attempted to throw the weight of
the state into certain types of bargains, in order to secure for the economically inferior party a fairer and more equal contract, the Supreme Court
has almost invariably decided in favor of unrestrained bargaining power,
and adopted, at times expressly, at times impliedly, an individualistic
theory of the concepts of property and contract.
Because of the millions directly affected, state power has been most
commonly exerted in favor of labor.46 Where the purpose has been to protect health and bodily safety, or to prevent practices akin to fraud or oppression, the legislation has been sustained. Some of the earlier opinions
indeed strongly intimated that the state might, simply because of the
4 See New York Times, August I, 1933. Compare the above statement with that made in
an address delivered in New York City, July 6th. "There is no change of any provision of the
Constitution attempted in this law. Therefore all the time-honored constitutional rights of the
individual remain unmodified by this law. Second, there exists no constitutional right to do
anything which is forbidden by this law. There is no constitutional right to compete unfairly;
and there is no business competition which is more unfair or more harmful to all the people
than the competition of low wages and long hours which the National Recovery Act seeks particularly to eliminate." This statement may be correct if we ignore the fact that the Supreme
Court of the United States and not Mr. Richberg is the expositor of the Constitution. The
authors of this article do not, of course, attempt to declare what may be the decision of the
Court when this legislation is finally presented to it. The past opinions of the Court, however,
seem to be clearly out of harmony with Mr. Richberg's declaration.
4s"It may be said in a general way that the police power extends to all the great public
needs ..... It may lie put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing
morality or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the
public welfare." Holmes J. in Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 11x,31 Sup. Ct. i86,
I88, 55 L.Ed. x12 (1911). The police power "extends to so dealing with the conditions which
exist in the State as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of its people." McKenna J. in
Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311, 318, 27 Sup. Ct. 289, 291 (1907).
46See supra, note 36, for data concerning number of recent labor bills.
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economic inequality between employer and employee, exert its power in
behalf of the weaker party. Thus in Holden v. Hardy, 47 an hours of labor
case, the court through Mr. Justice Brown said, "The proprietors of these
establishments and their operatives do not stand upon an equality and
....
their interests are to a certain extent conflicting. The former naturally desire to obtain as much labor as possible from their employees, while
the latter are often induced by the fear of discharge to conform to regulations which their judgment fairly exercised would pronounce to be detrimental to their health or strength. In other words, the proprietors lay
down the rules and the laborers are practically constrained to obey
them. ' '4 Again, in Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison,49 the court sustained a
Tennessee statute requiring that all orders for merchandise given in payment of wages be redeemable at their face value in cash. The court quoted
with approval the supreme court of the state: "The statute's tendency,
though slight it may be, is to place the employer and employee upon equal
ground in the matter of wages, and so far as calculated to accomplish that
end, it deserves commendation." s° The current, however, soon turned in
the other direction. Lochner v.'New York s , can be disposed of, perhaps,
on the ground that as a health measure it was not justified by the facts.
Mr. Justice Peckham, who wrote the majority opinion, however, went
further and read into "due process" a declaration in favor of the individualistic philosophy of Adam Smith, Ricardo and Herbert Spencer. "There
is no reasonable ground for interfering with the liberty of person or the
right of free contract, by determining the hours of labor in the occupation
of a baker. There is no contention that bakers as a class are not equal in
intelligence and capacity to men in other trades or manual occupations, or
that they are not able to assert their rights and care for themselves without the protecting arm of the state interfering with their independence of
judgment and of action. They are in no sense wards of the state. Viewed
in the light of a purely labor law, with no reference whatever to the question of health, we think that a law like the one before us involves neither
the safety, the morals, nor the welfare of the public, and that the interest
''
of the public is not in the slightest degree affected by such an act. S2
4' 169 U.S. 366, 18 Sup. Ct. 383, 42 L.Ed. 78o (1898).
48 Ibid., 397.

49 i83 U.S. 13, 22 Sup. Ct. i, 46 L.Ed. 55 (igoi).
s Ibid., 20.

s98
9t U.S. 45, 25 Sup. Ct. 539, 49 L.Ed. 937 (igo).
Ibid., 57. Compare the well-known dissent of Holmes in this case at pages 75-76: "This
case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country does not entertain.
If it were a question whether I agreed with that theory, I should desire to study it further and
s2
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Both Adair v. United States5 3 and Coppage v. KansasS4 involved statutes making it a crime for the employer to interfere with the employee's
right to join a labor union by discharge, threats of discharge, or by imposing restrictive agreements in the contract of employment. In the former
case Mr. Justice Harlan found it unconstitutional for the state to restrict
the right of either party to the relation to terminate it at will, declaring
that, "in all such particulars the employer and employee have equality of
right, and any legislation that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary interference with the liberty of contract, which no government can legally justify in a free land."55 In the latter case Mr. Justice Pitney, speaking for
the majority of the court, in answer to a suggestion that the statute was
justified by the inequalities between employer and employee, said: "No
doubt, wherever the right of private property exists, there must and will
be inequalities of fortune; and thus it naturally happens that parties negotiating about a contract are not equally hampered by circumstances.
This applies to all contracts, and not merely to that between employer and
employee ..... And, since it is self evident that, unless all things are held
in common, some persons must have more property than others, it is from
the nature of things impossible to uphold freedom of contract and the
right of private property without at the same time recognizing as legitimate those inequalities of fortune that are the necessary result of the exercise of those rights. But the Fourteenth Amendment, in declaring that a
State shall not 'deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due
process of law' gives to each of these an equal sanction ;it recognizes 'liberty' and 'property' as co-existent human rights, and debars the States from
an unwarranted interference with either. And since a State may not strike
them down directly it is clear that it may not do so indirectly, as by delong before making up my mind. But I do not conceive that to be my duty, because I strongly
believe that my agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with the right of a majority to
embody their opinions in law ..... The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert
Spencer's Social Statics ..... A constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic
theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez
faire. It is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding
certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our
judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution
of the United States." The precise effect of this case has been largely nullified by later decisions. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 28 Sup. Ct. 324, 5g L.Ed. 551 (19o8); Bunting v.
Oregon, 243 U.S. 426, 37 Sup. Ct. 435, 6i L.Ed. 830 (1917), and see dissents of Taft C.J. and
Holmes J. in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525,43 Sup. Ct. 394, 67 L.Ed. 785 (1923).
s3 208 U.S. 16i, 28 Sup. Ct. 277, 52 L.Ed. 436 (xoo8).
S4236 U.S. i, 35 Sup. Ct. 240, 59 L.Ed. 44i (1915).

usSupra, note 53, 175.
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daring in effect that the public good requires the removal of those inequalities that are but the normal and inevitable result of their exercise,
and then invoke the police power in order to remove the inequalities,
' 's6
without other object in view.
These are hard words to meet when it is proposed that in order to preserve our economic establishment, it is necessary to decrease the awards to
capital and increase those of labor. Nearly a decade later came a more
direct attempt to secure to the worker a greater share of the products of
his labor. Laws were passed requiring that women workers should be
paid a wage sufficient at least to sustain them in health and morals. Again
the majority of the court asserted that such an attempt was beyond the
power of government. s7 This law, it was said, "forbids two parties having
lawful capacity ....
to freely contract with one another in respect of the
price for which one shall render service to the other in a purely private
employment ..... The law takes account of the necessities of only one
party to the contract. It ignores the necessities of the employer by compelling him to pay not less than a certain sum, not only whether the employee is capable of earning it, but irrespective of the ability of his business
to sustain the burden ..... It compels him to pay at least the sum fixed
in any event, because the employee needs it, but requires no service of
equivalent value from the employee .....
"To the extent that the sum fixed exceeds the fair value of the seivices
rendered, it amounts to a compulsory exaction from the employer for the
support of a partially indigent person, for whose condition there rests upon
him no peculiar responsibility, and therefore in effect, arbitrarily shifts to
his shoulders a burden, which, if it belongs to anybody, belongs to society
as a whole ..... Certainly the employer, by paying a fair equivalent for
the service rendered, though not sufficient to support the employee, has
neither caused nor contributed to her poverty. On the contrary to the extent of what he pays he has relieved it ..... It has been said that the
legislation now under review is required in the interest of social justice, for
S6 Supra, note 54, 17. There were strong dissenting opinions in both the Adair and Coppage
cases. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 42 Sup. Ct. 124, 66 L.Ed. 254 (1921), holding that the
equal protection of the law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is violated by a state statute
which deprives the employer of the remedy of injunction for certain injuries to his business by
striking employees, also indicates the unfriendliness of the majority of the Court to legislation
favoring labor in its struggle with capital. The effect of Texas & N. 0. R. Co. v. The Brotherhood, 281 U.S. 548, 50 Sup. Ct. 427, 74 L.Ed. 1034 (i93o), sustaining an act of Congress prohibiting a railroad from interfering with the employee's choice of representatives under the
Railway Labor Act of 1926, is still uncertain. See Sharp, Movement in Supreme Court Adjudication, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 361, 388 (1933):
s7Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394, 67 L.Ed. 785

(1923).
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whose ends freedom of contract may lawfully be subjected to restraint.
The liberty of the individual to do as he pleases is not absolute. It must
frequently yield to the common good ..... But nevertheless there are
limits to the power, and when these have been passed it becomes the plain
duty of the courts in the proper exercise of their authority to so declare.
To sustain the individual freedom of action contemplated by the Constitution is not to strike down the common good but to exalt it; for surely the
good of society as a whole cannot be better served than by the preservation against arbitrary restraint of the liberties of its constituent members." ' Apparently the dictate of the German, Stammler, that "every
power of control conferred by law can be justified only in the sense that
the individual subject thereto can yet exist as a fellow creature," has no
place in American constitutional law.5 9
Governmental limitation upon the prices charged by vendors of goods
and services has leaned for support on the concept of a business affected
with a public interest.6° For nearly half a century it appeared that here
was a principle which would enable the state to check in behalf of the consumer, as the shifting conditions of business might require, the charges of
the producer. In the pioneer case of Munn v. Illinois 6ythe court sustained
the fixing of storage charges for grain elevators in the City of Chicago.
"When private property is 'affected with a public interest it ceases to be a
jus privati only'..... Property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make it of public consequence, and affect the
community at large. When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use
in which the public has an interest, he in effect grants to the public an
interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for
the common good ..... " Because of the important part played by the
Chicago elevators in the commerce of the nation, it was held that the
business came within the declared rule, and the fact that there was no precise precedent for the regulation was immaterial. The case was one "for
the application of a long-known and well-established principle in social
8

s Ibid., 554-561.

59Rudolph Stammler, Lehre von dem richtigen Recht,

lines of Lectures on jurisprudence

208-211,

quoted in Pound, Out-

(1920), 55.

60"It must be conceded that all businesses are subject to some measure of public regulation," from the opinion of Mr. justice Sutherland in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S.
262, 273, 52 Sup. Ct. 371, 372 (1932). Senator Wagner of New York, speaking on behalf of the
National Industrial Recovery Act before the House Committee on Ways and Means, stated,
"This bill makes explicit the principle that all business is affected with the public interest."
Quoted in 4o American Federationist (July 1933), 689.
6194 U.S. 113 (1877).
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science, and this statute simply extends the law so as to meet this new development of commercial progress. ' '62 At the same term of court statutes
fixing railroad rates were also sustained. 63 In strong and vigorous opinions
the court later reaffirmed the principles of Munn v. Illinois and sustained
the regulation of prices not only for grain elevators, 64 but also for fire insurance companies5 and for carriers of oil by means of pipe lines." The
Court, however, later receded from this advanced position. In Chas.
Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 67 the state of Kansas,
in an endeavor to deal with industrial strikes, declared that the manufacture and transportation of food, clothing, and fuel were businesses affected
with a public interest and subject to public control for the purpose of assuring a continuous supply of these necessities. A unanimous court
frowned upon the idea. Businesses affected with a public interest were
limited to three categories: (i) those where some special privilege granted
by the state was enjoyed; (2) certain occupations regarded for historical
reasons as exceptional, e.g., inns and gristmills; (3)those in which the public has a particular claim under the principle of Munn v. Illinois. The
court speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Taft, showed a reluctance to
extend the third category. "In a sense the public is concerned about all
lawful business because it contributes to the prosperity and well being of
the people. The public may suffer from high prices or strikes in many
trades, but the expression 'clothed with a public interest' as applied to
business, means more than that the public welfare is affected by continuity or by the price at which a commodity is sold or a service rendered.
.... It has never been supposed, since the adoption of the Constitution,
that the business of the butcher, or the baker, the tailor, the wood chopper, the mining operator, or the miner was clothed with such a public interest that the price of his product or his wages could be fixed by state
regulation ..... Nowadays one does not devote one's property or business to the public use or clothe it with a public interest merely because one
makes commodities for, and sells to, the public in the common callings of
which those above mentioned are instances."6
62Ibid., 126 and 133.
6sChicago, Burlington, and Quincy R.R. v. Iowa, 94 U.S. 155, 24 L.Ed. 94 (1877), and other

cases.
64Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517, 12 Sup. Ct. 468, 36 L.Ed. 247 (1892); Brass v. North
Dakota, 153 U.S. 391, 14 Sup. Ct. 857, 38 L.Ed. 757 (1894).

6sGerman Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 34 Sup. Ct. 612, 58 L.Ed. iozi

(19114).
6United

States v. Ohio Oil Co., 234 U.S. 548, 34 Sup. Ct. 956, 58 L. Ed. 1459 (1914).
61Ibid., 535-537.

67262 U.S. 522, 43 Sup. Ct. 63o, 67 L.Ed. 1103 (1923).
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10
In the three cases of Tyson v. Banton, 9 Ribnick v. McBride, and
7
Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 1 involving the fixing of prices for resold
theater tickets, employment agencies, and gasoline, the retreat from
Munn v. Illinois became almost a rout. The principle that property "becomes clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make it of
public consequence and affect the community at large" could not, said
Mr. Justice Sutherland, who wrote the majority opinion in all three cases,
be generally applied, but must be confined to the specific facts of the
Munn case. Stated affirmatively, "a business in order to be affected with
a public interest must be such or be so employed as to justify the conclusion that it has been devoted to a public use and its use thereby in effect
granted to the public." 72 The italics are Mr. Justice Sutherland's and his
meaning is made clearer by the example he uses of a public street opened
upon private land, and by the contrast between his statement of the principle with that of Mr. Justice Stone, 73 dissenting, "Price regulation ....
is within a state's power whenever any combination of circumstances seriously curtails the regulative force of competition so that buyers or sellers
are placed at such a disadvantage in the bargaining struggle that a legislature might reasonably anticipate serious consequences to the community
74
as a whole."
The statutes regulating the labor contract, and fixing prices of commodities and services were designed for the immediate benefit of the
worker and the consumer. The National Industrial Recovery Act, and
much of the new state legislation rests, however, on the broader base of a
general public interest, and on a conviction that the national welfare, if
not the very safety of the country, requires a governmental control over
previous private interests. Unfortunately, however, when direct group
69 273

U.S. 418, 47 Sup. Ct. 426, 71 L.Ed. 718

(X927).

70 277 U.S. 350, 48 Sup. Ct. 545, 72 L.Ed. 913 (1928).

U.S. 235, 49 Sup. Ct. 115 (1929).
Tyson v. Banton, supra, note 69, 434. This statement was repeated in the two subsequent cases.
73 Ribnick v. McBride, supra, note 70, 359. The position of the majority in these three
cases is substantially that of Justices Field and Brewer dissenting in Munn v. Illinois and Budd
v. New York, supra, notes 6i and 64.
7' 278
72

74 The two later cases of Tagg Bros. v. United States, 280 U.S. 420, 5o Sup. Ct. 220, 74
L.Ed. 524 (i93o), and O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 25X, 51 Sup. Ct.
130, 75 L.Ed. 324 (1931) sustaining respectively the regulation of the charges of commission
men in live stock yards, and of insurance agents' commissions for writing fire insurance do not
overrule the cases just discussed. The power to regulate in these last two cases was based on
the fact that the subject matter directly affected was an integral part of a larger business, over
which the state's control had already been established.
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interest has been lacking-and a statute proposes to regulate so-called private business for the welfare of that omnipresent, but not usually vocal
third party, the general public, it has found even less sympathy from our
Supreme Court. In Chas. Wolff Packing Company v. Court of Industrial
Relations,7 s the state of Kansas endeavored to grapple with the problem
of the strike in industry with its attendant public injury by granting to the
state the power to settle the differences between employer and employees to
the end that the public might not be damaged through cessation in the supply of fo6d, fuel, or other necessities of life. In the words of Mr. Chief Justice Taft, "The necessary postulate of the Industrial Court Act is that the
state, representing the people, is so much interested in their peace, health,
and comfort that it may compel those engaged in the manufacture of food
and clothing, and the production of fuel, whether owners or workers, to
continue in their business and employment on terms fixed by an agency
of the state, if they cannot agree." 76 Compared with recent proposals for
state control over industry the Kansas experiment seems a mild one, and
yet the Court by a unanimous opinion, held it unconstitutional. Such
recognized liberal thinkers as Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis did not even give it the comfort of noting a dissent. 77 Even assuming
that the production of the necessities of life might come within the category of "businesses affected with a public interest" the court denied that
the state might, against the owner's desires, compel him to operate his
establishment for the benefit of the public, and if that were true as to the
owner, then a fortiori, much more would it be true as to the employee.
This obligation to render a continuing service to the public "can only arise
when investment by the owner and entering the employment by the
worker create a conventional relation to the public somewhat equivalent
to the appointment of officers and the enlistment of soldiers in military
service. '' 75 On the first appearance of the case before the Supreme Court
the order of the Court of Industrial Relations fixing wages was held constitutionally ultra vires. On the second appearance a like order fixing
hours of labor was also condemned. 79 It was not the wage-fixing feature of
the first order that invalidated it, but the claim of general power to regulate between employer and employee the terms of their contract, in order
75262 U.S. 522, 43 Sup. Ct. 630, 67 L.Ed. 1103 (1923).
76Ibid., 533.

77This may be explained on the ground that neither the employing nor the employed
classes, those most directly concerned in the legislation at hand, favored its enactment.
78Supra, note 75, 541.
79Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 267 U.S. 552, 45 Sup. Ct. 44r,
69 L.Ed. 785 (1925).
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to protect the public interest by preventing a paralysis of essential industries. If this be true, is it within the power of the state to compel employers and employees to shorten the working day, probably against their own
personal interests, in order that those otherwise unemployed may be given
a portion of the work performed by those already employed?
New State Ice Company v. Liebmann 8o arose nearly ten years after the
Kansas Industrial Court cases and was decided in the midst of the present
economic depression. A statute of Oklahoma gave to the State Corporation Commission power to deny to any person the right to enter into the
business of manufacturing ice, if in the opinion of the Commission there
were already sufficient facilities to meet the public demands in that respect. The majority of the Court denied that the manufacture of ice
could be considered a public calling, and held that any "regulation which
has the effect of denying or unreasonably curtailing the common right to
cannot be upheld consistent
engage in a lawful private business ....
with the Fourteenth Amendment."'" Experimentation by the state of
Oklahoma in this direction was therefore forbidden. This time, however,
Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice Stone protested against the decision
of their fellow justices.2 This was partly on the ground that under peculiar local conditions the manufacture of ice in Oklahoma might well be
considered a public utility. But Mr. Justice Brandeis went further. By
the time his opinion was written the economists and publicists of the nation were mobilizing their plans to deal with our financial and business
crisis. To their proposals the dissenting judges were at least tolerant.
"The people of the United States are now confronted with an emergency
more serious than war. Misery is widespread in a time, not of scarcity,
but of over-abundance ..... Rightly or wrongly, many persons think
that one of the major contributing causes has been unbridled competition.
Increasingly, doubt is expressed whether it is economically wise, or morally right, that men should be permitted to add to the producing facilities
of an industry, which is already suffering from over-capacity ..... They
assert that through improved methods of manufacture made possible by
advances in science and invention and vast accumulations of capital, our
industries had become capable of producing from 30 to ioo per cent more
than was consumed even in the days of vaunted prosperity; and that the
present capacity will, for a long time, exceed the needs of business. All
80285 U.S. 262, 52 Sup. Ct. 371, 76 L.Ed. 747 (1932).

81Ibid., 278.

82Mr. Justice Cardozo did not partake in the consideration or decision of the case. It may
confidently be assumed that had he done so his attitude would have been the same as that of
Justices Brandeis and Stone.
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agree that irregularity in employment-the greatest of our evils-cannot
be overcome unless production and consumption are more evenly balanced. Many insist that there must be some form of economic control.
There are plans for proration. There are many proposals for stabilization.
And some thoughtful men of wide business experience insist that all projects for stabilization and proration must prove futile unless, in some way,
the equivalent of the certificate of public convenience and necessity is
made a prerequisite to embarking new capital in an industry in which the
capacity already exceeds the production schedules." 3 The learned justice
recognized that the proposal was fraught with difficulties, but thought
nevertheless that the Court should not oppose its will if "a single courageous state" chose to "serve as a laboratory" for trying "novel social and
economic experiments. 8' 4 Apparently the "New Deal" has obtained sympathetic consideration from at least a minority of the members of the Supreme Court.
IV
Much of this new legislation is indeed of a frankly temporary and
emergency character. The National Industrial Recovery Act rests on the
declaration of a national emergency and is limited to a space of two years
after its enactment, unless the President shall sooner declare the emergency ended. As such there is good ground to believe that it may be sustained. In Wilson v. New,58 at the time of a threatened nation-wide railroad strike, a five to four majority of the United States Supreme Court
sustained the fixation of wages and hours of railroad employees. While
"an emergency may not call into life a power which has never lived, nevertheless emergency may afford a reason for the exertion of a living power
already enjoyed."86 In the time of acute housing shortage and high rents
after the World War the same five to four majority in the Court sustained
the regulation of rents by a governmental commission8 The first of these
decisions rested its approval of the legislation on the ground that the
83 Supra, note 8o, 306-309. The dissent is heavily annotated with references to scientific
and popular articles on economic planning.
A
84 See statement of the Honorable Alfred E. Smith, infra, note io.

85243 U.S. 332, 37 Sup. Ct. 298, 61 L.Ed. 755 (1917).
96Ibid., 348.
87Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458, 65 L.Ed. 865 (1921); Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170, 41 Sup. Ct. 465, 65 L.Ed. 877 (1921); Levy Leasing Co. v.
Siegel, 258 U.S. 242, 42 Sup. Ct. 289, 66 L.Ed. 595 (1922). In Chastleton Corporation v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 44 Sup. Ct. 405, 68 L.Ed. 841 (1924) it was held that when the emergency
was over, such acts ceased to be valid.
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emergency had so changed circumstances as to clothe with a public interest "what at other times or in other places would be a matter of purely
private concern." A later decision reaffirming this position relied, moreover, on a more general exposition of the police power. "The warrant for
this legislative resort to the police power was a conviction on the part of
the state legislators [i.e., of New York] that there existed in the larger
cities of the state a social emergency caused by an insufficient supply of
dwelling houses and apartments so grave that it constituted a serious
menace to the health, morality, comfort, and even to the peace of a large
part of the people of the state. That such an emergency if it really existed
would sustain a resort, otherwise valid, to the police power for the purpose of dealing with it cannot be doubted, for unless relieved, the public
welfare would suffer in respects which constitute the primary and undisputed, as well as the most usual, basis and justification for exercise of that
power." 88 That the present economic depression presents an almost unparalleled emergency, periling the morals, health, and lives of the people,
and even the existence of the state itself, few can deny, and it is hardly to
be expected that the Supreme Court will do so. We have no data for determining in such crises what measures of relief are permissible. In the
terrific trial of the Civil War the safety of the state constituted sufficient
warrant for the issuance by the federal government of fiat money as a
means for preserving the government in its struggle for existence. 9 The
present machinery for industrial recovery is certainly no more than is
necessary to restore prosperity to the land, and even that may fail. It is
useless casuistry to ask whether in times of emergency the constitution
may be deemed suspended, or whether its provisions are broad and flexible
enough to permit the exercise of powers not ordinarily usable. In any
event, there is ample authority for the proposition that in such times as
8 Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, supra, note 87, 245. In Block v. Hirsh, supra, note 87, Mr.
Justice McKenna, dissenting, feared the possible extension of the doctrines of the case. "If
such an exercise of government be legal, what exercise of government is illegal? Houses are a
necessary of life, but other things are as necessary. May they, too, be taken from the direction
of their owners and disposed of by the government? .... It is to be remembered that the legality of power must be estimated, not by what it will do, but by what it can do ..... The
facts are significant and suggest the inquiry, have conditions come not only to the District of
Columbia, embarrassing the Federal Government, but to the world as well, that are not amenable to passing palliatives, and that Socialism, or some form of Socialism, is the only permanent
corrective or accommodation? It is indeed strange that this court, in effect, is called upon to
make way for it and through the instrument of a Constitution based on personal rights and the
purposeful encouragement of individual incentive and energy, to declare legal a power exerted
for their destruction."
89Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457 (1871).
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these customary private interests must be subordinated to what is deemed
the needs of the public welfare and safety. 9°
A disposition of the problem purely as an emergency measure can, however, hardly be permanently satisfactory. While some of the advocates of
the new departure of government into fields of economic control stress its
temporary and emergency character, others view it as of a much broader
and more enduring nature. To the chief executive of the nation, the National Industrial Recovery Act "represents a supreme effort to stabilize
for all time the many factors which make for the prosperity of the nation." 9' An emergency measure to expire within two years, or until the
end of the present economic crisis, hardly justifies the appellation of a
"Crevolution" given to it by Mr. Donald Richberg.92 The prophets of the
new order are proposing not temporary measures to be applied only while
disaster is imminent, but fundamental and enduring planning during
times of normal prosperity in order that subsequent catastrophe may be
averted. 93 The acute suffering we are now experiencing is recognized to
have had its origin in the over-production of the years of prosperity and
the lack of a purchasing power in the great mass of society to consume the
output of our great national industrial and agricultural machine. It is a
condition likely again to occur in an unregulated economic state if and
when prosperity is restored. Many of the measures proposed can indeed
operate satisfactorily only when the country is on an even economic keel.
The great experiment is right now facing possible disaster by an artificial
increase in prices, when delayed prosperity still leaves millions unemployed and millions of others with purchasing power greatly reduced by
assets frozen in closed banks, and the return from investments in stocks
and mortgages completely vanished. There is now little need to restrict
new additions to our capital structure. Unemployment reserves are hard
to establish and are apt to be ineffective when thousands of businesses are
90People v. Nebbia, 186 N.E. 694, decided July 11, 1933, by the New York Court of Appeals, held constitutional an act regulating the milk business and authorizing the milk control
board to fix minimum wholesale and retail prices. (See note 33, supra.) Southport Petroleum
Co. v. Ickes (see C.C.H. Fed. Trade Regl. Service, 7th ed., 52o3) decided Aug. IS, 1933, by
the Supreme Court of the Dist. of Columbia, held constitutional section 9(c) of the N.I.R.A.
Economy Dairy Co. v. Wallace (C.C.H. Fed. Trade Reg]. Service, 7 th ed., 52o) decided Aug.
29, 1933, by the same court, held constitutional the Agricultural Adjustment Act. Blaisdell
v. Home Bldg. and Loan Assn., 249 N.W. 334 (Minn., July 7, 1933) held constitutional as
an emergency measure, in spite of the contract clause of the federal constitution, a legislative
extension of the period of redemption from mortgage foreclosures. See contra, State ex. rel.
Cleveringa v. Klein, 249 N.W. 118 (N.D., June 12, 1933).
9' See note 39, supra.
92See

note 44, supra.

93See notes 27, 28, 29, supra.
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on the verge of bankruptcy and millions of workers are out of employment. 94 The "New Deal" means not only extraordinary emergency legislation but the dawn of a new political and economic era.
V
If the Supreme Court is to sustain redistribution of purchasing power
and economic planning through direct regulation, it is apparent that the
attitudes displayed and the principles enunciated in Coppage v. Kansas, 95
Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations 96 and Adkins v.
Children's Hospital97 must be renounced. The individualistic thought and
action displayed in those and kindred cases must be reversed by a change
in philosophic attitude, and a development of a tradition of the social responsibility of the individual. 95 If this cannot be done, speculation is rife
as to the possibility of creating a new philosophy by various methods of
packing the Court 9
For the court to renounce, repudiate, or ignore the more extreme of its
individualistic pronouncements would not, however, be an entirely novel
phenomenon. "It is a peculiar virtue of our system of law that the process
of inclusion and exclusion so often employed in developing a rule, is not
allowed to end with its enunciation, and that an expression in an opinion
yields later to the impact of facts unforeseen."' Anglo-American law is
empirical and pragmatic. It grows largely from case to case, and not by
logical deductions from declared general premises. The belief of Marshall
in McCulloch v. Maryland,10' that, for the purpose of determining the
94In Chap. 186, Laws of Wisconsin 1933, the compulsory operation of the Wisconsin Unemployment Reserves Act was extended "until business recovery is well under way in Wisconsin."
9s See note 54, supra.
96See note 67, supra.
97See note 57, supra.
98See A. A. Berle, Jr., A High Road For Business, in Scribner's Magazine, June 1933, 325;
Tugwell; op. cit., supra,note 27, 3-7; Alfred E. Smith, note iio, infra. Compare the following
paragraph from Sharp, supra, note 56, 8og: "Individualistic habits will probably not soon disappear. Mental and civic individualism may in fact be more than ever essential if other depressions in time produce what some expect, a relatively co-operative industrial system. If
technical and administrative developments do indeed require the creation of new types of cooperative social and industrial organizations, and the extension of social control, it is possible
to expect that such developments will not meet a permanent obstacle in the decisions of the
Supreme Court. The wisdom of the Court has led it throughout its history to recognize the
necessity for practical adjustments in its administration of justice."
99Paul Y. Anderson, If the Supreme Court Objects, The Nation, July i9,1933, 64.
- Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting, in Jaybird Mining Co. v. Weir, 271 U.S. 6O9, 619, 46
Sup. Ct. 592, 595 (1926).
"' 4 Wheat. 316 (i8ig).
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boundary between immunity of federal instrumentalities and the power
of the states, he had discovered in the principle of sovereignty "an intelligible standard, applicable to every case to which the power may be applied" was certainly not realized in the following years. The original dogma that a corporation is a creature of the law, having no existence beyond
the borders of the state that created it, had to yield to the practical exigencies of commerce. 02 The litigation over the commerce clause is strewn
with the broken fragments of attempts at definition and generalization,
and the court at times has openly confessed that its decisions have been
dictated more by considerations of practical expediency than by the
logical application of declared legal principles. ° 3 Moreover, pure individualism has never been maintained in our law. The hirer of labor may
be prohibited from offering as the price of wages hours of work detrimental
to the health of his employees.104 A business may be prohibited not because it, in itself, is a menace to the public good, but because it is one of a
class in which that menace does exist and for administrative purposes it is
impractical for the law to do other than generalize.1 x s Taxation has often
been used as a means of directing economic life along certain channels, °5
and regulatory statutes have been sustained which except from their
operation certain groups and classes believed to be in need of economic aid
°7
rather than of restriction."
That drastic governmental control over industry teems with perils must
be admitted. In his dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann,"°s Mr. Justice Brandeis observed, "The objections to the proposal are obvious and
grave. The remedy might bring evils worse than the present disease. The
obstacles to success seem insuperable. The economic and social sciences
are largely unchartered seas. We have been none too successful in the
modest essays in economic control already entered upon. The new pro- Henderson, The Position of the Foreign Corporation in American Constitutional Law
(1918); Note, 3 Wis. L. Rev. 1oo (1925).
1o3Galveston, etc. Ry. v: Texas, 210 U.S. 217, 28 Sup. Ct. 638 (1908).
"04Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426, 37 Sup. Ct. 435, 6i L.Ed. 830 (1917).
"osPowell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 8 Sup. Ct. 992, 32 L.Ed. 253 (1887).
106American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89, 21 Sup. Ct. 43, 45 L.Ed. 102

(igoo); Quong Wing v. Kirkendall,

223 U.S. 59, 32 Sup. Ct. 192, 56 L.Ed. 350 (1912).
this respect the law appears to have progressed to the position stated in the text. Cf.
Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540, 22 Sup. Ct. 43x, 46 L.Ed. 679 (1902) with
International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 U.S. 199, 34 Sup. Ct. 859, 58 L.Ed. 1276 (1914)
and Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers Ass'n., 276 U.S. 71, 48 Sup. Ct. 291
(1928). In the last case the aid given to agricultural co-operatives was of a positive and not
merely negative character.
108Supra, note 8o.
1-7 In
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posal involves a vast extension of the area of control. Merely to acquire
the knowledge essential as a basis for the exercise of this multitude of
judgments would be a formidable task; and each of the thousands of these
judgments would call for some measure of prophecy. Even more serious
are the obstacles to success inherent in the demands which execution of the
project would make upon human intelligence and upon the character of
men. Man is weak and his judgment is at best fallible. ' I' ° 9 The Hon. Alfred E. Smith has recently expressed similar doubts as to the wisdom of
the N.I.R.A." ° "I have never hesitated to recommend the extension of
government activities to meet the needs of a growing population in an age
of industrial invention, but this plan goes beyond anything my imagination can follow. I may be old-fashioned, but I can't understand how it can
possibly work ..... If we could give the planners a corner of Alaska, or
a chunk of the Bad Lands, for their experiment, it would not be so serious.
Then if the laboratory blew up, the whole nation would not suffer."'- A
little farther on Mr. Smith states, "In such a triumph of bureaucracy, the
little man would be lost in the shuffle." It is interesting to compare this
last with President Roosevelt's emphasis upon, and plea to, the little man
to co-operate, in his radio address of July 24, 1933.12
It is entirely possible, of course, that some governmental acts under a
scheme of social planning will be directed not to the welfare of society as a
whole, but to ignoble ends of partisanship and class favoritism. The Fourteenth Amendment, unless it is to be totally repudiated, should, it is
clear, be applied to annul arbitrary acts of spoliation and discrimination.
And yet it is extremely difficult to draw the line between the good and the
evil law. Is the current agitation against the chain store designed to foster
the common weal, or is it merely to protect the independent inerchant?
Suppose new labor-saving devices are discovered reducing drastically the
cost of the product to the consumer, but throwing thousands of workers
out of employment. Would suppression or restriction of the new invention
be in the interests of society, or an act of favoritism to the vested interests
of capital and labor in the old industry? It is apparent that such questions
0o9
Supra, note 8o, 309.
,X%Alfred E. Smith, Business Control, in the New Outlook, July, 1933, 9-10.
Compare the language of Mr. Justice Brandeis on the locale of experimentation, in his
dissenting opinion in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, supra, note 8o, especially at 3i I,--"It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk
to the rest of the country."
I "But, important as is the heartening demonstration, the richest field for results is among
the small employers, those whose contribution will give new worlk for fromr one to ten people,"
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as these cannot be answered by use of the customary dogmas of our legal
system. If large scale economic planning is to be attempted, it seems dear
that a new hierarchy of governmental agencies must be established to administer the difficult technological, financial, and human problems that
the proposal entails. Judicial control can be only remote and supervisory,
as is now the situation in relation to most administrative bureaus.
The importance of the judgments the Supreme Court must make when
the program for the "New Deal" is presented to it cannot be minimized.
The American principle of judicial review declared in Marbury v. Madison," 3 and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment have
made the Court the battlefield on which competing political, social and
economic theories wage their Armageddons. Thus the Court will be called
upon to decide whether, under our Constitution, the nation must in matters economic be ruled largely by a spirit of laissez faire, or whether the
state may through the force of its members control the individual's rights
of property and contract in the economic interest of the common society.
Thrice in its long history the Supreme Court has wrestled with problems
calling not so much for legal reason and acumen, as for the highest attributes of statesmanship. First, Marshall and his colleagues wrought from
the vague generalities of the Constitution our federal system; then, in the
era following the Civil War, the Court resisted the efforts of the radicals in
Congress by drastic reconstruction to humble state power; and lastly,
after the close of the Spanish-American War it was decided that no obstacle should be placed in the "path of empire" on which the nation had
entered. It seems probable that the work on which the.Court must shortly
enter will, in its importance and effect on the nation's life, be fully comparable to the tasks already performed.
11 1 Cranch. 137 (18o3).

